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31. INTRODUCTION
This sixth report from the Commission to the Council on the situation in world
shipbuilding follows the Commission’s obligation to report on the situation in the
world shipbuilding market, laid down in Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1540/981 and is in line with the previous five reports2. Moreover, it responds to
the request expressed by the Council during its meeting on 6 June 2002, namely to
report on latest developments in the shipbuilding sector in time for the Industry
Council in November3.
The Council decided on 27 June 2002 that the Commission should make a final
effort to solve the problems stemming from certain business practices by Korean
yards and achieve an amicable agreement with South Korea by 30 September 2002 at
the latest. Should the Commission report the failure of these talks, it would be
authorised to request a dispute settlement at the WTO. At the same time a temporary
defensive mechanism4 should be authorised for certain market segments and for a
limited period only.
Two rounds of talks with the Government of Korea and shipyard representatives
were conducted by the Commission (26-27 August 2002 in Seoul and 24-27
September 2002 in Brussels), but positions could not be reconciled and the talks
therefore failed.
In the absence of a negotiated solution, the Commission has initiated WTO action.
The Commission's Decision on WTO action has been published in the Official
Journal of 19 October and the request for bilateral consultations with the Republic of
Korea has been introduced on 21 October. A first consultation meeting will take
place before the end of November.
Given that fully consolidated market data for the year 2002 will only be available
towards the end of the first quarter of 2003, this report is limited to the key market
developments in the first half of 2002.
In addition it provides an update of the previously undertaken cost investigations and
summarises the new cost investigations made since the presentation of the fifth
report.
As with previous reports, certain underlying key elements, e.g. concerning scope and
methodology of the market monitoring undertaken by the Commission, are not
repeated here. Those elements are covered in the previous reports and are listed in
the introduction to the fifth shipbuilding report.
                                                
1 OJ L 202, 18.07.1998, p1
2 COM(1999) 474 final; COM(2000) 263 final; COM(2000) 730 final; COM(2001) 219 final;
COM(2002) 205 final
3 Following the reorganisation agreed by the European Council in Seville, the relevant Council is now the
Competitiveness Council.
4 Council Regulation 1177/02, OJ L 172, 02.07.2002, p1
42. MARKET ANALYSIS
2.1. Key market developments
2.1.1. Ordering activity and market shares
The global shipbuilding market increasingly feels the impact of the past over-
ordering, the US recession, the uncertainties in the world economy and the effects of
11 September. Order intake in 2002 has so far been very slow and selective.
Following a decade of almost continuous growth and a boom year in 2000, the rate
of generation of new orders has declined sharply (see graph). This change has
affected EU shipbuilding in particular. In the absence of any significant cruise-ship
ordering activity, the volume of the order-book (i.e. the existing workload) within the
EU is shrinking quickly.
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The rate of generation of new orders in the first half of 2002 was around 60 % below
the peak year 2000 (comparing quarterly figures) and has reached the lowest point
since 1992. Ordering at EU yards was 77 % below the level in 2000. The downturn
in ordering has been accompanied by a fall in prices of more than 15 % on average as
compared to the 2001 level, in general returning to levels last seen in 1999.
Most affected by the deteriorating market conditions are container ships and cruise
ships. Only product tankers see a comparatively stable demand, due to the
replacement of old tonnage following new EU maritime safety regulations
(« Erika »).
The following table shows the total of orders placed in compensated gross tonnes –
cgt (Source: World Shipbuilding Statistics, LR).
NEW ORDERS IN 2000 NEW ORDERS IN 2001 NEW ORDERS IN 1ST HALF OF 2002
29 500 000 23 648 000 6 004 280
5Looking at particular shiptypes, the impact of the developments described above
becomes even clearer (all figures in cgt; source: World Shipbuilding Statistics, LR).
SHIPTYPE NEW ORDERS IN 2000 NEW ORDERS IN 2001 NEW ORDERS IN 1ST HALF
OF 2002
Container ships 7 369 000 4 970 500 519 000
Cruise ships 2 581 000 0 135 000
LNG carriers 1 238 000 2 196 600 517 600
Product/chemical
tankers
2 767 900 3 558 100 1 364 900
The market shares developed as follows (based on cgt):
2000 2001 1ST HALF OF 2002
South Korea 36 % 33 % 30 %
EU 19 % 12 % 10 %
Japan 26 % 34 % 37 %
China 7 % 8 % 9 %
Regarding container ships even more tonnage will enter the market in the coming
months (reflecting the massive ordering for this shiptype in 2000 and 2001),
probably leading to lower freight rates and thus a disincentive to place new orders.
The expected economies of scale from ever bigger container ships are now seen to be
limited, due to restrictions in ports and the imbalances in cargo volumes on the major
trading routes.
Concerning cruise ships the market sentiment is still to some extent suffering from
the events of 11 September. Cruise ship operators have responded by shifting cruises
to areas closer to the USA (from which most cruise customers still originate), and
reducing prices for cruises. Priority clearly lies with filling existing capacity, rather
than striving for further fleet expansion. The resulting reduced revenue provides a
disincentive for new investments. The on-going discussions about merging some of
the biggest cruise operators have also contributed to a reluctance to pursue new
investment in this market segment.
Another of the mainstays of world shipbuilding, oil tankers, is suffering from low
freight rates. In addition there are now fears regarding military action and terrorist
threats to oil tankers in the Middle East, which could have various effects: Increasing
oil prices, leading to lower demand for oil shipments (through decreased demand and
procurement from sources closer to the main markets, thus lowering the total
tonnage-miles) and increased use of other sources (oil by pipelines, alternative forms
of energy). Moreover, insurance premiums would sharply increase and drive
6operational costs up. This volatile situation makes shipowners reluctant to pursue
investment in new ships.
On the other hand, the demand for dry bulk ships in a certain size range has been
quite strong, due to increased need for imports of coal and iron ore to China and
Japan.
In the segment of product tankers, where recent maritime safety legislation in Europe
has triggered the need for replacement of old ships, demand has also remained
comparatively stable.
The LNG market has not lived up to some of the optimistic forecasts made in 2000
and 2001 and ordering is well below the projections made then. The Commission, in
its fifth shipbuilding report, expressed caution regarding this segment, and although
there is a general trend towards cleaner energy and ordering for new ships is still well
above the average of previous years, market forecasts are now more conservative.
There remains a significant production over-capacity in the shipbuilding sector,
estimated to be at least 20 to 30 % above the levels required for the necessary
replacement of old tonnage and the accommodation of additional demand stemming
from increased sea-borne trade. This over-capacity continues to have a negative
effect on prices.
2.1.2. Price developments
Ship prices have declined by about 15 % since mid-2001, affecting almost all
shiptypes. The biggest drops were seen for container ships in the 3500 TEU range
(minus 20 %, comparing June 2001 to June 2002), large bulk carriers (minus 17 %)
and large oil tankers (minus 15 %). But also higher value ships saw prices receding
across the board (LNG carriers: minus 9 %, small container ships: minus 9 %). It is
notable that the market segments most affected were those where Korean yards have
their traditional product focus, indicating that the need to fill the large building
facilities in Korea leads to fierce competition between the major Korean yards for the
few remaining orders, keeping prices locked at a very low level or even indicating a
further decline.
The ship price index maintained by the Commission reflects these developments (see
graph). It shows that the price recovery in 2001, when ordering was strong, was not
sustained and price levels are the lowest for more than a decade.
7Price index for ship newbuildings (1987 = 100)
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2.2. Responses to market developments
Shipbuilding is still considered by many nations a strategic industry, which, in their
view, they cannot afford to lose, because of trade and defence interests. Therefore,
the issue of over-capacities is hardly addressed and various measures are taken in
order to maintain shipbuilding capacity despite lower market requirements. In a
generalised manner it can be said that market mechanisms only selectively apply to
the world shipbuilding industry. The next paragraphs give some indications on the
policies pursued in the key shipbuilding regions, in response to the current
problematic market situation.
2.2.1. Europe
EU shipyards have already been forced for a longer time to focus primarily on
market segments with a higher value added, where Asian shipbuilders have been less
active (passenger ships, specialised and smaller vessels), as they could not match the
very low offer prices from Korean yards for standard ships. EU yards face a very
difficult situation as the passenger ship market has significantly slowed down and an
alternative market segment of similar importance is not in sight. A number of
European yards (in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Poland)
went bankrupt or had to lay off workers (in Denmark, Germany, Finland, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Poland) since the date of the Commission’s
last report. Very few yards have orderbooks stretching beyond 2003/2004.
EU yards are undertaking various measures to improve their competitiveness
(increased R&D, product and process innovation, outsourcing and downsizing of
their workforce, procurement of hulls for outfitting etc.), but may be running out of
time in the face of an almost flat market.
82.2.2. South Korea
Korean yards seem to repeat past practices when facing a declining demand. On the
one hand they try to enter new market segments (gas tankers, offshore structures and
cruise ships), on the other hand they try to trigger more demand in their traditional
market segments (tankers and container ships). Both are done through lowering offer
prices, despite significant cost increases in Korean production over the past 12
months. Wages in Korean yards have increased by ca. 6 %, material costs have
increased by ca. 5 % (steel, however, is up 10 %), inflation is ca. 8 % and the WON
has appreciated by ca. 8 % vis-à-vis the USD. Labour and material costs together
account for ca. 90% of total production costs in shipbuilding and the related cost
increases are therefore significant.
Due to this a number of Korean yards could be heading for insolvency.
Unfortunately, neither the Korean Government nor the shipyards themselves seem to
consider reducing capacity, e.g. through the closure of non-profitable shipbuilding
facilities.
2.2.3. Japan
Japanese shipbuilding is currently undergoing massive restructuring, bringing
together a number of shipyards under the umbrella of a few large groups. The
resulting synergies have helped Japanese yards to stay competitive (in particular
regarding the series production of bulk carriers), although this is significantly
assisted by the fact that ca. 50 % of the order intake comes from domestic demand
(currently mainly for bulk carriers). These orders by Japanese shipowners are almost
inaccessible to other shipbuilding countries and therefore provide a captive market
for Japanese yards.
2.2.4. China
Chinese yards enjoy a much lower labour cost base than the other main shipbuilding
countries, but still suffer from organisational problems, limited access to technology
and delivery delays. Market share of Chinese shipbuilders has continuously increased
over the past years (mainly resulting from competitive offers for simple shiptypes)
and once the above problems can be overcome, China could become a major player
in world shipbuilding. However, there are concerns that shipyards are expanded
beyond the market requirements and the need to upgrade existing facilities. The
Commission will carefully watch these developments and try to engage China in a
constructive dialogue on these issues, in the framework of the OECD and bi-
laterally.
2.3. Cost investigations
2.3.1. Update of previous cost investigations
In line with previous reports, this report contains an update of all previous cost
investigations undertaken by the Commission within its market monitoring exercise.
The methodology of these cost investigations has been described in the first two
shipbuilding reports and is not repeated here. The approach is continuously refined
and results appear to be very close to the real situation.
9As shipbuilding projects take significant time to be completed, and actual costs may
change until delivery of the vessel, the cost investigations have to be based on
forward assumptions. These assumptions are continuously reviewed and results are
updated whenever new or better information is received. This is reflected in the table
below. The reference to the shipbuilding report in which the particular order is
covered should be used to see the details of the order investigated. As the
Commission’s market monitoring progresses, ship orders previously investigated and
now completed can serve to verify the cost modelling. So far, none of the cost
investigations has been found to deviate significantly from the factual costs of
production.
The abbreviations used refer to the following Korean shipyards:
DHI: Daewoo Heavy Industries
DSME: Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering
HHI: Hyundai Heavy Industries
HMD: Hyundai Mipo Dockyard
HHIC: Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction
SHI: Samsung Heavy Industries
The shiptypes appear as listed by Lloyd’s Register.
For container ships the container carrying capacity in TEU (Twenty-Foot-
Equivalent-Unit) is indicated, with ships above 5000 TEU falling into the category of
the so-called Post-Panamax container ships.
LNG carrier stands for Liquefied Natural Gas carrier.
ULCC stands for Ultra Large Crude oil Carrier, VLCC for Very Large Crude oil
Carrier.
The terms Aframax, Suezmax, Panamax and Capesize indicate certain standard
dimensions and specifications for tankers and bulk carriers, respectively.
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Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for selected
new shipbuilding contracts (update August 2002)
SHIPYARD SHIPTYPE OWNER
CONTRACT
PRICE
(MIO.
USD)
NORMAL
PRICE
(MIO.
USD)
LOSS/GAIN
AS % OF
NORMAL
PRICE
REF. TO SHIP-
BUILDING
REPORT NO.
Daedong Product tanker Seaarland 21,5 25,7 –16 % 1
Daedong Panamax bulk
carrier
Sanama 18,5 26,0 – 29 % 1
Daedong Chemical
tanker
Cogema 24,5 30,2 –19 % 2
Daedong 2500 TEU EF Shipping 30,0 31,2 –4 % 4
DHI VLCC Anangel 68,5 74,2 –8 % 1
DHI Ferry Moby 74,3 88,4 –16 % 2
DHI Panamax bulk
carrier
Chandris 22,5 22,8 –1 % 2
DHI LNG carrier Bergesen 151,1 164,2 –8 % 3
DHI ULCC Hellespont 85,0 93,7 –9 % 4
DSME
(ex-DHI)
LNG carrier Exmar 162,0 169,2 –4 % 5
Halla Panamax bulk
carrier
Diana 18,9 31,1 –39 % 1
Halla 3500 TEU Detjen 38,0 53,0 –28 % 1
Halla Capesize bulk
carrier
Cargocean 32,0 46,2 –31 % 2
Samho
(ex-Halla)
Aframax oil
tanker
Chartworld
Shipping
33,5 41,5 –19 % 4
Samho
(ex-Halla)
VLCC Oldendorff 69,5 90,9 –14 % 5
Samho
(ex-Halla)
Suezmax oil
tanker
Thenmaris 43,0 55,4 –19 % 5
HHI 6800 TEU P&O Nedlloyd 73,5 81,6 –10 % 1
HHI 5600 TEU K Line 54,3 59,1 –8 % 2
HHI LNG carrier Bonny Gas 165,0 176,8 –7 % 2
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HHI 5500 TEU Yang Ming 56,0 63,7 –13 % 2
HHI Ferry Stena 70,0 88,2 –21 % 4
HHI Suezmax oil
tanker
Jebsen 43,0 51,2 –16 % 4
HHI 7200 TEU Hapag-Lloyd 72,0 79,5 –9 % 3
HHI Suezmax oil
tanker
Athenian Sea
Carriers
43,0 49,9 –14 % 3
HHI LNG carrier Golar 162,6 178,4 –9 % 5
HMD Cable layer Ozone 37,3 46,8 –20 % 1
HMD Chemical
tanker
Bottiglieri 24,5 26,3 –7 % 4
HHIC 6250 TEU Niederelbe 62,0 66,2 –6 % 3
HHIC 5608 TEU Conti 58,0 61,0 –5 % 3
HHIC 1200 TEU Rickmers 19,5 21,3 –8 % 3
Il Heung Chemical
tanker
Naviera
Quimica
10,5 13,0 –19 % 2
SHI 5500 TEU Nordcapital 55,0 68,0 –19 % 2
SHI 3400 TEU CP Offen 36,0 52,4 –31 % 1
SHI Ferry Minoan 69,5 87,9 –21 % 1
SHI 7400 TEU OOCL 79,7 91,5 –13 % 4
SHI LNG carrier British Gas 162,5 176,5 –8 % 5
SHI 5762 TEU CP Offen 55,0 66,7 –18 % 5
Shina Product tanker Fratelli
D'Amato
21,7 24,1 –10 % 3
2.3.2. New cost investigations
Since the fifth shipbuilding report seven new cost investigations have been
undertaken.
These concern the following orders placed in South Korean yards:
– Capesize bulk carrier (series of 3 plus 1 option), 26 250 cgt, to be built by HHI
– Product tanker (series of 6), 19 200 cgt, to be built by HMD
12
– Product tanker (series of 3 plus 4 options), 24 880 cgt, to be built by STX
Shipbuilding Co. (ex-Daedong)
– Product tanker (series of 2 plus 2 options), 24 879 cgt, to be built by STX
– Capesize bulk carrier (series of 2), 26 250 cgt, to be built by Samho Heavy
Industries (ex-Halla)
– 2 500 TEU container ship (series of 5 plus 5 options), 18 972 cgt, to be built by
HHI
– Liquefied Product Gas carrier (LPG) (plus 1 option), 14 521 cgt, to be built by
STX
The results of these cost investigations are summarised below.
Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for selected
new ships (new investigations)
SHIPYARD SHIPTYPE OWNER
CONTRACT
PRICE
(MIO. USD)
NORMAL
PRICE
(MIO. USD)
LOSS/GAIN AS %
OF NORMAL PRICE
HHI Capesize bulk
carrier
Golden Union 36,0 45,2 –20 %
HMD Product tanker Schoeller 26,0 27,1 –4 %
STX Product tanker Target Marine 25,5 28,7 –11 %
STX Product tanker Byzantine
Marine
29,5 36,0 –18 %
Samho Capesize bulk
carrier
Marmaras 36,0 53,6 –33 %
HHI 2 500 TEU
container ship
P&O Nedlloyd 27,5 32,7 –16 %
STX LPG carrier Qatar Shipping 30,0 40,1 –25 %
These results confirm the findings from previous reports. Korean yards continue to
sell ships at prices below full costs of production. As prices for ships from Korean
yards have been lowered further in the reporting period, while costs of production
have increased, the gap between contract price and normal price is widening. For the
latest investigations this gap is 18 % on average (not weighted), while it was 8 % for
the new cost investigations summarised in the fifth report.
The results also confirm that certain yards, such as HMD, operate more carefully
than others. It should be noted that Samho (ex-Halla) and STX (ex-Daedong) were
among those yards going into receivership after the Asian crisis of 1997/98.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
The crisis in world shipbuilding is deepening, with very slow order intake in the
major shipbuilding regions in the first six months of 2002. The main reasons are past
over-supply, slowing economies around the world and the effects of 11 September.
Only Japanese yards currently still manage to fill building slots. However, this is
very much helped by domestic demand, in particular for bulk carriers, as has been
long-standing practice in this region.
World-wide ordering for new ships in the first half of 2002 was down by almost 2/3,
compared to average quarterly figures in 2000, which on the other hand was the best
year ever for shipbuilding. In the EU, the situation is even worse, with ordering being
down by almost 4/5 compared to the year 2000.
Most affected are container ships and cruise ships, but crude oil tankers and LNG
carriers have also seen lower demand. Demand has remained comparatively stable
only in the segment of product tankers, due to replacement needs stemming from
new EU maritime safety legislation, and in the segment of bulk carriers.
As a result shipyards are running out of work and a number of bankruptcies and lay-
offs, mainly in Europe, have already occurred.
Prices for new ships have declined further and are now at the lowest level for more
than a decade.
Yards in South Korea have further lowered offer prices, despite increases in all major
cost factors and a number of Korean yards may find it difficult to meet their financial
obligations if order intake is not increased soon.
The Commission’s detailed cost investigations for orders placed in South Korean
yards confirm the findings from previous reports, namely that ships are offered at
prices which do not cover the full costs of production. The investigations show that
the gap between offer prices and calculated normal price is again widening.
